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The Patriation of .ca
Gregory R. Hagen† and Kim G. von Arx‡

Introduction

top level domain (‘‘TLD’’) (i.e., registry operations) and its
subdomains. This control enables ICANN and the DoC
to create and destroy TLDs and their subdomains, delegate and redelegate domains of any level, and influence
areas such as rights to names, trademark law, privacy law,
domain name distribution, domain name ‘‘taxation’’,
Internet stability and security, authentication policy as
well as other areas. 11
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C

ountry code top level domains (‘‘ccTLD’’s), such as
.ca, are distinct from generic top-level domains
(‘‘gTLD’’s), such as .com, in that they are generally conceived to be associated with a specific country. 1 In
Canada, the authority to operate the technical functions
of the .ca domain name registry has been delegated to
the Canadian Internet Registration Authority (‘‘CIRA’’) 2
by a United States non-profit corporation, the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(‘‘ICANN’’). 3 The authority to make policy regarding the
.ca has purportedly been delegated to CIRA by the Government of Canada. 4 There is an issue, however, as to
whether ICANN’s delegation of authority to CIRA to
manage the technical functions of the .ca reflects a
diminished ability of Canada to decide the identity of
the .ca registry and, by implication, to control the registry’s operational policies, thereby diminishing Canada’s
sovereignty over the .ca domain. 5
While ICANN has been criticized as illegitimate, 6
unfair, 7 anticompetitive 8 and its dispute settlement procedure systematically biased, 9 this paper steps back from
those issues and asks whether acknowledging the technical authority of a private foreign entity over the .ca
domain is consistent with Canada’s commitment to
political sovereignty. For, as Lessig has pointed out, in
cyberspace, code (computer hardware and software) is
like law in that code regulates how cyberspace behaves. 10
Applying this observation to the DNS, we argue that the
structure of the DNS, which enables the U.S. Department of Commerce (‘‘DoC’’) to decide who manages the
technical aspects of the .ca, implies that Canada lacks
sovereign control over the .ca domain space and related
policies and laws.
While the principal of sovereign control over the .ca
as a Canadian space for e-commerce is important in and
of itself, there are also practical consequences that could
arise from a lack of control. In short, the hierarchical
DNS technology, which ICANN regards as technically
necessary, allows the DoC and ICANN to influence critical policies by being able to decide the identity of the .ca
registry and to tie contractual conditions to the use of a

The delegation of power by ICANN to CIRA to
operate the .ca is the cyberspace analogy to the historical
delegation of powers by Parliament in the U.K. to Parliament in Ottawa to enact federal laws governing Canada.
Legally speaking, Canada is in a similar position with
respect to .ca ‘‘constitutional law and policy’’ now as it
was with Canadian law prior to the patriation of the
Constitution. Analogous to Canada’s constitutional
powers prior to patriation, Canadian authority over the
.ca is derived from and depends upon a foreign
authority, just as the powers provided for under the Constitution were derived from and depended upon the
Westminster Parliament. Consequently, in order for
Canada to obtain sovereignty in cyberspace, we claim
that policies related to the .ca domain should be
‘‘patriated’’ in analogy with the patriation of the Canadian Constitution.

ICANN’s Technical Foundation

I

CANN was established as an answer to two problems,
one technical and one political. 12 The technical
problem is how to ensure the stable functioning of
Internet services such as web browsing and e-mailing.
For example, one should be able to consistently send
one’s e-mail to its intended destination as defined by the
receiver’s e-mail address and view the intended web page
when a domain name is entered into a browser’s location box. The technical answer that has been given is
that the DNS must be a hierarchical system, with a
single authority, ‘‘a unique authoritative root’’ that, like
the baton of an orchestra conductor, tells Internet users
how to find the authoritative domain name mappings. 13

†Replacement Assistant Professor, University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law. A previous version of this paper was submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the LL.M. (concentration in law and technology) at the University of Ottawa.
‡Legal counsel to Canadian Internet Registration Authority (CIRA). The opinions expressed herein are not necessarily those of CIRA.
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On this model, whoever controls the root is the
orchestra conductor.
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The existence of a hierarchical system of domain
name servers on the Internet is somewhat surprising
when one considers that one of the most fundamental
aspects of the Internet is the absence of a locus of control.
The original motivation for such a packet switched network was that of redundancy, or the requirement that
there should be no single point of failure (or control)
under an attack on the network. 14 A related fundamental
principle is the idea of ‘‘end-to-end reasoning’’. Reed and
Saltzer have explained this concept as the idea that, in a
communications system, a function ‘‘can completely and
correctly be implemented only with the knowledge and
help of the application standing at the end points of the
communication system’’. 15 Similarly, Isenberg has
written about a new philosophy and architecture where
‘‘intelligence’’ is at the edges of the network rather than
in the network itself is developing. He writes that ‘‘it
would be engineered for intelligence at the end-user’s
device, not in the network. And the network would be
engineered simply to ‘Deliver the Bits, Stupid,’ not for
fancy network routing or ‘smart’ number translation’’. 16
In order to further understand the technical solution, it is useful to consider that each computer host on
the Internet is assigned a unique Internet protocol (‘‘IP’’)
address which encodes both a network and host identifier. 17 Because IP numbers are difficult for people to
remember and lack portability, Internet standards provide for the creation of domain names for computer
hosts. These names also allow for easy memorization and
host name portability over changing Internet service
providers. The assignments of domain names to IP
addresses were recorded in a central ‘‘root’’ database
administered by a single person. As such registrations
increased, however, a hierarchical naming system was
created in order to lessen the administrative burden of
name assignments. In essence, TLDs were registered by
the root authority, and the registration of subdomains of
TLDs was delegated to TLD registries.
The legacy root (often called the ‘‘A root’’), or
highest level, of the name space is unnamed. Below the
legacy root are TLDs that are divided into classes
according to their use as military, educational, government, commercial, territorial, and so on. Currently, there
are 257 top level domains. There are a total of three
types of TLDs, two of which are relevant here. One is the
‘‘gTLD’’, such as .com, .net, .mil, .gov, etc. 18 These TLDs
are ‘‘generic’’ in the sense that they are generally viewed
as global because they are not associated with any specific territory. 19 The second type of TLD is the ‘‘ccTLD’’,
such as .ca (Canada), .de (Germany), .uk (United
Kingdom), .tv (Tivoli), .ch (Switzerland), .au (Australia),
and .jp (Japan), of which there are currently 243. These
ccTLDs have been delegated to registries, whose codes
are assigned from a table known as ISO-3166-1, which is
maintained by the International Organization for Stand-
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ardization (ISO). Beneath the top level domains are
second level domains such as gc.ca, third level domains
such as ic.gc.ca, and so on. Finally there is one infrastructure TLD (‘‘iTLD’’) called .arpa. The iTLD is the Address
and Routing Parameter Area domain and is used to perform mappings of domain names to IP addresses. 20
Many registries, such as CIRA, outsource to registrars the service of recording registrations in their respective registries (while some registries, such as the TV Corporation, record names themselves). In order to initially
obtain a second level domain name assignment (or a
third level domain name assignment in the case of those
registries, e.g., Australia and the United Kingdom, who
generally permit only third level domain registrations), a
person whether natural or juridical (‘‘registrant’’) registers
an available domain name with the registry via a registrar or the registry directly. The relevant entity then
record the registrant’s name, contact information, and
often at least two IP numbers which point to servers
which can resolve the name. Conflicting name mappings
are avoided primarily by allocating domain names in the
gTLDs and most of the ccTLDS on a first-come, firstserved basis. 21 The responsibility for adoption of procedures and policies for the assignment of second level
domain names (or third level, in the cases mentioned
above) and lower level hierarchies of names is delegated
to TLD registries, subject to the policy guidance contained in ICANN policies and any agreements that may
exist between the TLD registry and ICANN.
Certain authority relations are coded into the DNS.
When a user types in a domain name into a browser, a
client-sided resolver usually queries a local Internet Service Provider (ISP) name server to search its corresponding database of resource records for a record of the
necessary assignment. Certain kinds of resource records,
called ‘‘zone files’’, contain the assignments of domain
names to IP addresses for a particular zone, which is a
portion of a domain space. By pointing its resolver to the
ISP name server, the Internet user implicitly acknowledges the authority of the ISP name server’s response. If
the ISP cannot provide the relevant assignment because
it has not been cached, or the validity of the information
has expired, the ISP server usually queries one of the 13
legacy root name servers. 22 Thus, the ISP also implicitly
accepts the authority of the root server to which it points.
The root name server is associated with a master file
called the ‘‘root zone file’’ that lists the name and location of the TLD servers that the root operator considers
authoritative. 23
So long as everyone recognizes the same family of
hierarchically organized databases as authoritative, with
the legacy root name server at the top, the mappings of
domain names to IP address, including those contained
in the root zone file, will be unique with respect to that
DNS. 24 In essence, on this approach, the uniqueness of
name-to-address mappings in the legacy DNS is guaranteed because there is ultimately one unique authoritative
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root server managed by ICANN, subject to its ultimate
control by the DoC, from which the entire legacy name
space is derived.

ICANN’s Political Foundation and
Its Implications
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T

he second reason for ICANN’s existence is political.
It is the answer to the query ‘‘who should control
the legacy root’’? Whoever controls the root controls
which, and how many, TLDs will be entered into the
legacy root and who will be the registry for each TLD.
ICANN has declared that it is the proper entity to
manage the unique authoritative root, answering the
basic political issue surrounding the current DNS. 25
Thus, despite the underlying end-to-end design philosophy of the Internet, a central point of control is used as
a means of coordinating Internet activities and regulating domain names. 26
Instead of the metaphor of an orchestra, with
ICANN as a conductor, Reed describes the tendency to
control as a more sinister invasion of trolls setting up
shop under our network bridges who must bless any
new protocols or applications. 27 Yet, ICANN did not
begin its life as such a troll. Due to the early funding of
the Internet by U.S. government agencies, the United
States government found itself in the, perhaps unwanted,
position of exercising control over the legacy root. By the
mid-1990s, the growth and increasing commercialization of the Internet led the U.S. government’s Green 28
and White Papers 29 to note the emergence of widespread dissatisfaction about the absence of competition
in domain name registration. The White Paper called for
the government to transfer control of the DNS to a
private corporation. Subsequently, a California nonprofit corporation called ICANN was established essentially by Jon Postel, and the government duly recognized
ICANN as the private organization which has the support of the Internet community to administer the functions of the legacy root. 30
The White Paper noted that some commentators
expressed concern that the suggested privatization plan
in an earlier Green Paper did not go far enough in
‘‘globalizing’’ the administration of the domain name
system. 31 Some believed that international organizations
should have a role in administering the DNS. 32 Others
observed that incorporating the new corporation in the
United States would entrench control over the Internet
with the U.S. government. 33 The United States government responded to these concerns in the White Paper:
The U.S. Government believes that the Internet is a
global medium and that its technical management should
fully reflect the global diversity of Internet users. We recognize the need for and fully support mechanisms that would
ensure international input into the management of the
domain name system. In withdrawing the U.S. Government
from DNS management and promoting the establishment
of a new, non-governmental entity to manage Internet

names and addresses, a key U.S. Government objective has
been to ensure that the increasingly global Internet user
community has a voice in decisions affecting the Internet’s
technical management. 34

Canada endorsed the United States’ privatization of
the DNS on the basis that privatization ‘‘divested U.S.
government agencies of control of DNS functions and
placed control in the hands of a ‘private sector’ group’’. 35
Despite Canada’s stated interest that the U.S. divest control over the DNS, the United States never did withdraw
control over the legacy root server. 36 In fact, the U.S.
General Accounting Office questioned whether the U.S.
government had the authority to transfer control of the
root server to ICANN and has not examined such issues
because there are no plans to transfer control over the
legacy root. It said:
The question of whether the Department has the
authority to transfer control of the authoritative root server
to ICANN is a difficult one to answer. Although control
over the authoritative root server is not based on any statute
or international agreement, the government has long been
instrumental in supporting and developing the Internet and
the domain name system. The Department has no specific
statutory obligations to manage the domain name system or
to control the authoritative root server. It is uncertain
whether transferring control would also include transfer of
government property to a private entity. Determining
whether there is government property may be difficult. To
the extent that transition of the management control to a
private entity would involve the transfer of government
property, it is unclear if the Department has the requisite
authority to effect such a transfer. Since the Department
states that it has no plans to transfer the root server system, it
has not examined these issues. Currently, under the cooperative agreement with Network Solutions, the Department
has reserved final policy control over the authoritative root
server. 37

According to the same review of the privatization of
the DNS, Counsel for the United States General
Accounting Office stated bluntly: ‘‘According to the
Department, it has no current plans to transfer policy
authority for the authoritative root server to ICANN, nor
has it developed a scenario or set of circumstances under
which such control would be transferred.’’ 38 Nancy Victory, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Telecommunications and Information commented:
Regarding the A Root server, the Department of Commerce has no plans to transfer policy control . . . When the
necessary technical capacity is in place, the department may
enter into a management agreement or other legal arrangement with ICANN for operation of the A Root server. 39

More recently, the Energy and Commerce Committee sent a letter to Secretary Donald L. Evans of the
DoC reiterating its view that ‘‘any assumption of control
over that asset [the legacy root] by any outside entity
would be contrary to the economic and national security
interests of the United States.’’ 40 Recent terrorist attacks
on the U.S. have increased its reluctance to divest control. Andy Müller-Maguhn, Europe’s ICANN Director, is
reported to have said:
It might be that after the Sept. 11 attacks, the U.S.
government is not behaving as if it would give any kind of
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control away. It doesn’t look like it at least to me, to be
honest, not all. If the United States government never plans
to give authority over the root zone files to ICANN . . . then
the issue might be raised . . . if it’s just the simulation of an
institution where the real power is the United States government. 41

ICANN’s power, then, is not the power to control
the legacy root server, which has been retained by the
U.S. government. Instead, ICANN’s power rests in its
management of DNS functions, which stems from its
contract with the United States DoC. The Memorandum of Understanding between ICANN and the
United States Government provides as its purpose that
‘‘the Parties will jointly design, develop, and test the
mechanisms, methods, and procedures that should be in
place and the steps necessary to transition management
responsibility for DNS functions now performed by, or
on behalf of, the U.S. Government to a private-sector
not-for-profit entity.’’ 42 Under this Agreement, ICANN’s
powers do nothing to alter control over the legacy root:
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This [administrative] function, however, does not
include authorizing modifications, additions, or deletions to
the root zone file or associated information that constitute
delegation or re-delegation of top-level domains. The
purchase order will not alter root system responsibility
defined in amendment 11 of the Cooperative Agreement. 43

Notwithstanding this reservation of rights, ICANN
is on a short leash. The U.S. government can terminate
the agreement on 120 days notice to ICANN. 44
Nevertheless, subject to approval by the U.S. Government, ICANN possesses the power to withdraw the
authority of any registry, such as CIRA, to act as the
registry of their respective ccTLDs, including the subdomains, and can transfer the ccTLD to other entities or
persons without such registry’s consent. 45 Indeed, Stuart
Lynn, ICANN’s president, recently summed up the
power that ICANN has over country code domains:
‘‘ICANN could, in theory, recommend that a particular
ccTLD be redelegated to a cooperating administrator,
and if the US Government accepted that recommendation, non-cooperating ccTLD administrators would be
replaced’’. 46
The most straightforward implication of ICANN’s
control is its apparent ability (to be discussed in more
detail below) to redelegate domain names, contrary to
any national legal requirements that a particular entity
be assigned such a domain name. For instance, at the
highest level, while the Government of Canada may
have delegated CIRA as the authoritative .ca registry, the
U.S. DoC is able to remove the .ca from the legacy root
server or map the .ca to IP addresses of a TLD name
server controlled by a different entity. By implication,
ICANN is also able to force the redelegation of second
level and lower domains, such as gc.ca and ic.gc.ca. More
subtly, ICANN can tie conditions to the use of domain
names, including requiring registries, registrars and registrants to conform to ICANN policies. For example,
under the Model Legacy Memorandum Agreement
between ccTLDs and ICANN, a registry must comply

with any policies established through the ICANN policydevelopment process. 47 Even if such policies were limited to those involving ‘‘technical coordination’’, ICANN
has construed the notion of ‘‘technical coordination’’
quite broadly so as to include intellectual property, privacy and competition policy. 48 This would provide
ICANN with a means to control registry and registrar
operations and policies, such as registrant and registrar
agreements.
One might argue, at this point, that it is ludicrous to
believe that the U.S. would threaten the stability of the
Internet in order to redelegate a single second level
domain, such as gc.ca, let alone a TLD, such as .ca. Moreover, it could be argued that, if a power struggle commenced (because, for example, CIRA refused to sign the
model Sponsorship Agreement) and the U.S. subsequently did remove .ca from the root zone file, services
using .ca domains would not come to a sudden halt.
Firstly, ISP name servers cache the most commonly used
.ca domains and therefore, the mappings to appropriate
IP addresses would not end until the validity of mapping
data in those zone files expired. Secondly, either CIRA
itself or major ISPs would begin to offer root server
services, replacing those offered by ICANN.
The difficulty with this idea is that, even if such root
server services could be provided, it requires ISPs worldwide to recognize the new root. If ICANN redelegated
.ca to another organization whose operations, for the
sake of argument, were in the U.S., then the attempt by
CIRA or an ISP to supply .ca services would potentially
conflict with those services supplied by the redelegated
.ca registry. In such a situation, it is likely that most ISPs
would rely upon the legacy server system rather than
CIRA’s .ca. The moral is that, while CIRA .ca services may
continue to work after ICANN’s removal or redelegation
of .ca, the maintenance of Canadian control over the .ca
would require modifications to the DNS protocols and
architecture so that other ccTLDs recognized CIRA’s
authority over .ca. This paper simply advocates making
the requisite changes to the DNS architecture sooner
rather than later.
A second example of ICANN’s power over .ca is its
effects on the privacy rights of registrants. ICANN’s
Model Sponsorship Agreement — as well as the subsisting agreements with Australia and Japan ccTLD registries — provides that ‘‘[t]he Sponsoring Organization
shall ensure that the zone file and accurate and up-todate registration data for the Delegated ccTLD is continuously available to ICANN, in a manner which ICANN
may from time to time reasonably specify, for purposes
of verifying and ensuring the operational stability of the
delegated ccTLD only’’. 49 There is a requirement, then,
that the technology of the TLD database must allow
ICANN continuous access to registration data. This obligation may contradict the Canadian Personal Information and Protection of Electronic Documents Act
requirement that disclosure of information to a third
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party must be with the consent of the subject of the
personal information in those cases where the registrant
objects to its disclosure to ICANN. 50
The simplest, but probably most significant implication of ICANN’s control over .ca, however, is that the
U.S. will be able to apply what is essentially a foreign
domain name ‘‘tax’’ to .ca domain name registrants. This
results from the fact that the Model Sponsorship Agreement requires CIRA to contribute to ICANN’s cost of
operation in accordance with the formula devised by
ICANN. To give an idea of the potential magnitude of
the tax, consider that the Sponsorship Agreement caps
the fixed annual portion of the CIRA contribution at
US$5000 and caps the variable portion of the total
annual fee at US$5,500,000 for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 2002. And while the Agreement provides that
the cap shall increase by 15% each fiscal year thereafter,
ICANN may increase the tax by a greater amount
without CIRA’s consent. 51 CIRA and its registrants may
begin to wonder if ICANN’s root server services are
worth the price.

A Friendly Redelegation: The Case
of the Mysterious Double
Delegation to CIRA

C

IRA is a not-for-profit Canadian corporation that is
responsible for operating the .ca ccTLD for all
Canadians in an efficient and professional manner. 52 The
Canadian government, in its communications with
CIRA and ICANN, has attempted to instantiate the U.S.
distinction between technical coordination and policy
authority. This distinction, outlined in the U.S. government’s White Paper, holds that ‘‘national governments
now have, and will continue to have, authority to
manage or establish policies for their own ccTLDs’’, but
that ‘‘the U.S. continues to believe, as do most commentors, that neither national governments acting as
sovereigns nor intergovernmental organizations acting as
representatives of governments should participate in
management of Internet names and addresses’’. 53
As regards technical coordination, the Canadian
government took the position that it ‘‘ . . . supports the
basic principles of introducing competition but minimizing government involvement in the actual running
of the DNS’’. 54 While CIRA is responsible for operating
the .ca, ‘‘[t]he Government of Canada . . . has recognized
ICANN’s primary responsibility for establishing, disseminating, and overseeing implementation of the technical
standards and practices that relate to the operation of the
global DNS’’. 55
In terms of policy, the Canadian government’s position is presently that ‘‘the .ca domain space is a key
public resource, helping to promote the development of
electronic commerce in Canada and important to our
country’s future social and economic development’’. 56

83
CIRA takes a similar position. 57 More generally the Government of Canada has confirmed that it has ‘‘overall
policy responsibility for the Information Highway’’. 58
Under the ICANN Government Advisory Committee
Operating Rules, the ‘‘ultimate public policy authority
over the relevant ccTLD rests with the relevant government or public authority’’. 59 As a result of its overall
policy authority, the Canadian government explicitly set
out specific principles which it expected CIRA to implement in its policies. 60
Originally, Jon Postel of Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA) 61 delegated the management of the
top level Canadian .ca domain to John Demco of the
University of British Columbia (UBC). 62 There was no
formal delegation of policy authority by the Canadian
government to Demco. Prior to the transfer of authority
to CIRA, John Demco and his group had managed the
.ca ccTLD on a voluntary basis with the help of the .ca
committee, at no charge to users. 63 At an Internet conference in June 1997 in Halifax, however, concerns were
expressed about the delay in obtaining .ca domains
which generated widespread dissatisfaction within the
Canadian Internet community where, under rules of delegation, timely responses to registration requests are a
priority. 64 Following the 1997 meeting, then, it was generally agreed that the Canadian Domain Name Consultative Committee (‘‘CDNCC’’) should be created to
address the transition from the current management of
the .ca domain to a commercial operation. 65
The CDNCC report proposed that a non-profit
entity be created much as had been proposed by the
earlier Green Paper in the United States. As a result,
CIRA was incorporated as a non-profit corporation on
December 3, 1998. Industry Canada noted that because
its basic goal was to privatize operation of the DNS, the
role of government in the transition process to a new
governing body is ‘‘naturally fairly limited’’. 66 The Government of Canada has interpreted its ‘‘fairly limited’’
role as that of delegating its inherent policy authority
over the .ca domain to this private corporation, CIRA.
Thus, on October 10, 2000, the Canadian government
wrote ICANN, stating that it ‘‘recognizes CIRA as the
administrator of the .CA. domain’’, 67 and ‘‘formally designate[s] CIRA as the Government of Canada’s designee to
be the .ca delegee’’. 68 In the same document, it also set
out certain general principles by which it expected CIRA
to abide.
IANA redelegated the technical authority over the
.ca domain to CIRA on December 3, 1998, and also
outlined the technical functions that CIRA would be
expected to perform in accordance with ICANN policies. 69 The redelegation went rather smoothly, mainly
because all concerned parties agreed upon the redelegation of .ca to CIRA. 70 The basis of the power of delegation is provided for in RFC 1591 71 written by Jon Postel
in 1994. ICANN subsequently adopted policy ICP-1 72
which modifies RFC 1591. The modifications have the

84
effect of giving more power to ICANN than it had under
RFC 1591. However, these additional powers did not
need to be implemented given the friendly transfer of
power to CIRA. 73
Although CIRA was founded upon the idea that
policy authority and technical authority over the .ca converged in it, it has been argued here that the need for the
delegation of technical authority to CIRA — which
makes a subordinate name server authoritative over TLD
subdomains — ultimately reserves a power in the delegator to influence policies with respect to the .ca TLD. In
the delegation process, the necessity of the technical
authority to enable public policy authority is evident
where, in its letter to ICANN, the Canadian government
requested that ICANN effect the necessary changes to
the Internet’s ‘‘legacy’’ root server to enable CIRA to
operate the .ca in accordance with Government of
Canada policies. 74 At present, then, Canada is not sovereign over the .ca.

Hostile Redelegation
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T

wo recent hostile redelegations vividly emphasize
DoC’s and ICANN’s ability to redelegate ccTLDs
over objections from the current ccTLD. In each case,
the national government wanted the redelegation to
occur while the existing TLD registry did not. The
redelegations demonstrate that physical control over the
operation of the ccTLDs lies with ICANN and the DoC.
As has been pointed out, control over the architecture of
the Internet generally, and the DNS specifically, enables
one to control law and policy relating to DNS functions.
The power to redelegate domains provides ICANN and
the DoC with the ability to influence or control the
operational policies of registrars and registries and to tie
conditions to the use of domain names which, in
essence, constitutes domain name law and policy.
The first example concerns ICANN’s hostile redelegation of the Australian Internet domain name space,
namely all the domain names ending in .au. 75 ICANN
used this opportunity to force the new .au registry to sign
a Sponsorship Agreement with ICANN by making the
redelegation contingent upon its execution. In that case,
ICANN redelegated the top level domain as well as
second level domains, such as org.au, 76 over the objections of both the current .au registry 77 and the .org.au
registry, without any finding of misconduct and without
a public comment process. 78
Redelegation consists of two stages: first, there is the
revocation of authority from an existing registry. Under
ICANN rules, ICANN ‘‘must receive communications
from both the old organization and the new organization that assure the IANA [i.e. ICANN] that the transfer is
mutually agreed’’. 79 Ignoring its own policy, ICANN justified withdrawing Robert Elz as the registry manager
based on the idea that ‘‘there is widespread — nearly
universal — support for moving the delegation of the .au
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ccTLD to an organization permitting broad participation
of the Australian Internet community in the development of policy for the .au ccTLD’’. 80
The second stage is the delegation of authority to a
new registry. In this matter, ICANN took the Australian
government’s wishes to redelegate to the new auDA registry as decisive, citing the policy of ICP-1 that the ‘‘[t]he
desires of the government of a country with regard to
delegation of a ccTLD are taken very seriously. The
IANA [i.e. now operated by ICANN] will make them a
major consideration in any TLD delegation/transfer discussions’’. 81 ICANN also referred to the fact that the
GAC Principles for Delegation and Administration of
ccTLDs were satisfied as a reason for delegating to the
new .au registry. Under the GAC principles, the government is authoritative over its own ccTLD policy and
decides the identity of the ccTLD registry. 82
Perhaps the most interesting example of the use of
the U.S. power to redelegate (without any regard to other
ccTLDs) 83 is the apparently hostile redelegation of the .us
domain to Neustar. In this case, ICANN did not give as
its rationale the need to transfer the .us to an accountable organization, since it had presumably already done
so when it delegated the .us registry functions to Verisign’s predecessor, Network Solutions. Like Verisign,
Neustar is a for-profit corporation owned by its shareholders and not a non-profit corporation accountable to
its members. Although the U.S. government did not
enter into a Sponsorship Agreement with Neustar, to
whom .us was redelegated, it does show that the U.S.
DoC is prepared to redelegate despite the ccTLD having
been previously delegated to a well-run corporate registry, such as Verisign. Perhaps the DoC felt that there
was no need to enter into a Sponsorship Agreement with
Neustar because the DoC believed that it could control
Neustar, a U.S. company, more easily than a foreign
corporation.
In fact, the U.S. government accomplished the
redelegation to Neustar unilaterally and without
ICANN’s approval. This transfer was completed ‘‘before
the completion of the normal IANA requirements’’, 84
which under ICP-1 and RFC 1591 require a formal
written agreement. It was apparently done without the
approval of the then existing .us registry and without the
written agreement required by GAC. While the earlier
hostile redelegation of .au was done with ICANN’s full
approval, the redelegation of .us was not. The official, and
somewhat obscure, explanation from the U.S. government was that ‘‘because of complexities of U.S. procurement laws, it was not able to extend the existing arrangements with VeriSign nor complete the necessary threeway set of communications among itself, ICANN, and
NeuStar’’. 85
ICANN’s explanation for its redelegation of the root
was essentially an admission that it does not have any
power to stop the U.S. government from changing data
in the A Root, so it must make the change in the legal
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delegee of authority to concur with the change of information in the root. Indeed, ICANN admits that if it had
not accepted the request from the U.S. it would have
‘‘created a situation where the event would have
occurred regardless but there would be inconsistent data
in the IANA database’’. 86 Given ICANN’s primary mission focus on technical stability, ICANN had to comply
with the DoC’s wishes.

Sovereign Claims and Property Law
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W

hile Internet architects are primarily interested in
technical stability — the uniqueness of name
mappings to IP addresses — national governments have
become increasingly interested in national sovereignty
over ccTLDs. 87 National sovereignty over ccTLDs would
ensure that the national government could control
country code domain name mappings and related policies above and beyond the uniqueness requirement.
Such control would ensure that the identity of the registry and the users of domain names and related concerns were subject to national law rather than foreign
control.
National governments, through the Government
Advisory Committee of ICANN, have attempted to
found their claims to sovereignty over their respective
ccTLDs by claiming that ccTLDs are ‘‘ public
resources’’. 88 Moreover, claims that domains are property
have been made at both the TLD level and lower levels.
By subjecting domain names to property rules, one can
ensure the persistence of TLD and other domain name
assignments in the sense that once validly owned,
domains cannot be transferred to a third party without
consent, expiration of ownership, or termination under
applicable law. Property rules are to be contrasted with
liability rules grounded in contract which compensate
invalid transfers of domain names monetarily. 89
Network Solutions (the predecessor in interest to
the existing .com registry, Verisign) has suggested that it
possesses trademark rights in the .com TLD as well as the
.com brand and rights to the database of registrant information. 90 While some domain names are trademarks
and, therefore, the risk of a company losing its trademarked domain name under a hostile redelegation is
minimized, such protection only applies to trademarked
domain names and will not apply where a new registrant of the trademarked domain is not making an
infringing use of it. Thus, one would have to look to a
general property right in domain names to ensure stability over hostile redelegations rather than trademark
law.
Secondly, the claim that domain names are public
property cannot be sustained given the nature of ownership of the Internet. The legacy root server is owned by
the United States government and arguably its contents
are, too. TLD name servers are owned by the TLD registries, and ISP name servers are owned by the respective

ISPs. Thus, if domains are property, they are likely to be
private property based upon the private ownership of the
physical objects underlying the domain names.
Thirdly, there is the difficulty that it is not widely
accepted that domain names per se are property. 91 TLDs
are delegated on the basis of an arrangement, sometimes
reduced to writing, with ICANN. Second (and sometimes third) level domain names are then obtained by
entering into a contract with a domain name registrar
and therefore are, prima facie, contractual in nature. The
contract to provide naming services is generally nonassignable, indicating that it does not have the transferability of property. This point of view has been affirmed
in the U.S. case Zurakov v. Registrar.com, in which the
court found on summary judgment that:
The question of whether a domain name is a ‘‘property
right’’ has not been considered by the courts of this state.
Accordingly, this court looks to courts in other jurisdictions
that have opined on this issue. In Network Solutions, Inc. v.
Umbro International Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80 (2000) the Supreme
Court of Virginia stated that, ‘‘a domain name registrant
acquires the contractual right to use a unique domain name
for a specified period of time’’. The Network Court relied
on Dorer v. Arel, 60 F.Supp.2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999). In
that case, the court stated that ‘‘[a] domain name that is not
a trademark arguably entails only contract, not property
rights. Thus, a domain name registration is the product of a
contract for services between the registrar and registrant’’. 92

The case of Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network
Solutions, Inc. is much to the same effect. 93
However, contrary authority does exist. In Kremen
v. Cohen, for example, the Court determined that
although the domain name ‘‘ sex.com ’’ was not tangible
property under United States law, it was nonetheless a
form of intangible property. 94 There have also been
claims brought in rem — that is, a claim against the
property itself — against a domain name under the
United States Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act. 95 As this appears inconsistent with the decisions that
hold that a domain name is not property, it seems to
indicate Congress’s intention to affirm that domain
names are in some instances indeed property, at least for
procedural and execution purposes. 96 The constitutionality of this legislation has been upheld. 97 Nevertheless,
the scope of the property right extends only to domain
names that are trademarks, and thus cannot support the
claim that domain names per se are the subject of property rights. 98
In Canada, there does not seem to be decisive
authority regarding the status of domain names as property. In Easthaven, Ltd. v. Nutrisystem.com Inc. , 99
Nordheimer J. found that domain names do not seem to
be property, but that even if they were, since they exist
only intangibly in cyberspace, they are not located in
Ontario, Canada. 100 The Court therefore dismissed the
plaintiff’s claim that ‘‘ sweetsuccess.com ’’ was property
located in Canada. Nordheimer J. states his views in
remarkably ambiguous language:
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It does seem to me to be difficult to characterize a
domain name as property. When I say property, I refer to
either real or personal property. I appreciate that a domain
name, like a copyright or a trade-mark, could be properly
characterized as intangible property. It does seem to me to
be difficult to characterize a domain name as property. 101

While the status of domain names is unsettled, sovereign control over domain name mappings cannot be
definitively supported by property law. The central difficulty is that, even if there were domestic property rights
in domain names, there would still be the problem that
a foreign government has the power to modify information contained in the legacy root server, which will regulate behaviour, regardless of any property laws that may
apply to domains. For example, if the Canadian government enacted a law declaring that it is the owner of the
.ca TLD, it would have little practical effect. Foreign control over the root implies that the foreign authority can
decide who is assigned the .ca, can redelegate the
domain and its subdomains against the wishes of the
registry, and can attach conditions and obligations to the
use of such domains.
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A Parallel with Constitutional Law

J

ohn Perry Barlow famously declared the independence of cyberspace from territorial sovereigns. 102 The
basic claim to independence results from the fact that
because, given current technology, the Internet does not
yet have naturally occurring borders, the network itself
defines a new distinct jurisdiction that can create its own
laws and legal institutions. 103 If cyberspace is independent of territorial sovereigns, then ICANN’s declaration
that it is the unique authoritative root for the domain
name space in cyberspace is tantamount to declaring
itself sovereign over the entire namespace, including the
.ca domain.
As David Post observed in 1998, the formation of
ICANN was a ‘‘constitutional moment’’ and ‘‘an exercise
in a kind of constitution-making, the creation of a global
governing entity with ultimate authority over this most
extraordinary (and most valuable) global resource’’. 104 As
Post has pointed out further, the liberal doctrine of the
sovereign state does not necessarily posit ultimate sovereignty in the territorial state, but is derived ultimately
from individual people who are sovereign within that
territory. 105 Therefore, ICANN might be considered the
sovereign authority over the domain space of gTLDs and
ccTLDs as a result of the collective consent of geographically dispersed Internet users. 106
However, ICANN itself is ultimately controlled by
the United States Government, both in terms of the
technical functions that ICANN performs and the U.S.
Government reservation of authority over the information contained in the root zone file. Therefore, any use of
the ICANN domain space is ultimately subject to control by the U.S. government. It turns out that, insofar as
cyberspace is restricted to ICANN domain space, cyber-

space did not gain independence from territorial governments, but rather reflects the ability of a foreign government to extend an extraterritorial reach into cyberspace
and beyond. From this point of view, ICANN’s delegation of authority to TLD registries is analogous to the
delegation of lawmaking power to colonies of an imperial government.
The question that arises is whether .ca is a cyberspace colony of the U.S., depriving Canada of sovereign
authority over its name space and its related policies. As
mentioned, these policies and laws not only include
‘‘constitutional’’ policies, such as CIRA bylaws, registrar
and registrant agreements and dispute settlement policies, but laws and policies that are affected by the DNS,
such as authentication, privacy, trademark, and other
laws. If it is, can Canada gain sovereignty over the .ca by
patriating it and its related policies as it did in the case of
the Canadian Constitution?
The term ‘‘patriation’’ is of uniquely Canadian
origin, derived from the verb ‘‘repatriate’’ which means
‘‘to restore to one’s own country’’. As Hogg points out,
since the British North America Act 1867 was not a
Canadian Act, it could not be ‘‘restored’’ to Canada.
Patriation, therefore, conveys the idea of a Constitution
becoming a Canadian instrument. 107 What, then, is the
nature of the patriation of the Canadian Constitution?
The answer of autochthony, which requires that a constitution be indigenous and derive its authority solely from
events occuring within Canada, is not, therefore, the
basis of the patriation. 108 The legal force of the Canada
Act 1982 and the Constitution Act 1982, like other U.K.
statutes which extend to Canada, depends upon the
power that the United Kingdom Parliament has over
Canada. These instruments depend upon an external
rather than a local root. 109
A second possible explanation of the nature of
patriation posits that its force derives from the legal termination of the imperial authority of the United
Kingdom. Pursuant to the Canada Act 1982, s. 2, ‘‘[n]o
Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed
after the Constitution Act 1982 comes into force shall
extend to Canada as part of its law.’’ 110 This discontinuity
in the United Kingdom’s ability to legislate over Canada
might have been thought a sufficient discontinuity to
make the Queen in right of Canada (but not in right of
the United Kingdom 111) Canada’s ultimate source of
legal authority. However, under the traditional view of
parliamentary sovereignty, this cannot be correct since,
under that view, the United Kingdom could at any time
repeal s. 2 of the Canada Act 1982. Accordingly, the
current Parliament could not bind future Parliaments by
its present enactments and, therefore, could not be
bound to refrain from enacting laws for Canada. In fact,
some scholars believe that there is a paradox of selfreference involved in thinking that any Grundnorm
(basic norm), such as a law regarding the amendment of
a constitution, could itself be amended, since, by hypoth-
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esis, the basic norm would then no longer exist to justify
the new rule regarding amendment. 112
Prior to the Constitution Act 1982, the major constitutional document of Canada was the British North
America Act, 1867, a statute of the United Kingdom
Parliament. As Canada gained increasing independence
from Britain throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an interesting feature of the British North
America Act, 1867 became increasingly irritating:
Canada did not have full responsibility for amendment
of its own Constitution. As a statute of the United
Kingdom, the British North America Act, 1867, which
effectively was Canada’s Constitution, could only be
amended by the United Kingdom Parliament. 113
Following 1867, Canada from time to time
requested the United Kingdom Parliament to pass legislation in order to accomplish that which Canadian legal
processes could not achieve. Legally speaking, the Westminster Parliament could enact any legislation for
Canada whether such legislation was of a constitutional
nature or not, and on occasion it did so, dealing with
matters as varied as copyrights and lighthouses. Of
course, practically speaking, Canada was not as
subordinate as this legal relationship indicates. In fact, a
convention developed whereby Westminster would legislate only at the request and with the consent of
Canada, usually expressed in a Joint Resolution of the
Senate and House of Commons. 114
A small step forward was made with the Statute of
Westminster, 1931. 115 With regard to the power to
amend or patriate the constitution, however, the Statute
of Westminster, 1931 appeared to maintain the status
quo. In essence, the Statute codified the already accepted
convention that Westminster would only pass laws
affecting the Dominion if Canada requested the U.K. to
do so. The preamble to the Statute of Westminster set
out the new position of the Dominions in relation to the
United Kingdom as recognized by the Balfour Declaration in 1926. The text of the Statute, as already outlined
above, did not terminate the ability of the United
Kingdom to legislate for the Dominions; instead, it set
out the newly restricted terms on which the United
Kingdom Parliament could do so. Section 4 of the
Statute provided as follows:
No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed
after the commencement of this Act shall extend, or be
deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of the law of that
Dominion, unless it is expressly declared in that Act that
that Dominion has requested, and consented to, the enactment thereof. 116

However, the Parliament of the United Kingdom
could still, as a matter of law, repeal or disregard section
4 of the Statute. Indeed, the U.K. Parliament could take
section 4 to mean that it kept open the legal possibility
of legislative action by the U.K. Parliament for Canada,
but without Canada’s consent.
Given that the Canada Act, 1982 only went slightly
further than the Statute of Westminster, 1931, what was

there in the patriation process, then, that could be said to
irreversibly terminate the legal power of the United
Kingdom Parliament over Canada? On Hogg’s view, if
the United Kingdom did purport to repeal s. 2 of the
Canada Act, 1982, ‘‘it is inconceivable that the Supreme
Court of Canada would accept the resuscitated power
and uphold the new law’’. 117 On this view, Canadian
courts would decline to recognize the United Kingdom’s
authority to make law for Canada and the fundamental
rule of recognition would shift to Canadian courts. 118
Why is that? On Hogg’s view, it is plausible that the fact
of independence, and not s. 2 of the Canada Act, 1982, is
itself sufficient to terminate the United Kingdom’s
power to enact laws or repeal them for Canada. 119 But,
how does the fact of independence answer the objection
that the sovereign Parliament of the United Kingdom
can legislate for Canada? After all, the Canadian courts
had confirmed in 1981 that the power of the United
Kingdom to enact constitutional amendments for
Canada (prior to 1982) was ‘‘unimpaired’’ and ‘‘undiminished’’. 120
In other words, under U.K. law, the United
Kingdom Parliament can still legislate for Canada just as
easily as it can legislate for France, and the British courts
will recognize that legislation to the extent possible. As a
matter of Canadian law, however, the answer should be
that the United Kingdom cannot legislate for Canada.
Under the Canada Act 1982, the United Kingdom has
no power to legislate for Canada after the Constitution
Act 1982 came into force. On Oliver’s approach, which
we have closely followed here, the patriation of the constitution succeeds not solely from a purported termination of U.K. authority. 121 It succeeds ultimately because
of the power and authority that is vested in Canadian
lawmakers by the Canadian public as well as the old
constitutional roots. As Oliver notes, the patriation succeeds because ‘‘ . . . those roots and new roots have been
and are being put down slowly in popular sovereignty, in
regional or provincial vetoes, in aboriginal consents, etc.,
and a new Canadian constitutional theory will gradually
uncover them.’’ 122 Patriation, then, requires a shift in the
object of ultimate consent within society. Does this same
explanation hold for the patriation of the .ca domain?

The Patriation of the .ca

T

he analogy between the politics of the domain
space and the politics of real space is striking. One
system is the system of legal relations embodied in statutes and common law decisions. The other is a system of
norms embodied in computer architecture. In each case,
there is a hierarchical system of authority relations. The
United Kingdom Parliament and the Courts of the U.K.
were superior to the Canadian Parliament, its constitution and Courts. The U.S. controlled root server system is
superior to the ccTLDs. In real space, there is a rule of
recognition that recognizes the enactments of the U.K.

88
Parliament as law. In domain space, there is a rule of
recognition that recognizes the TLD assignments of the
legacy root name server as binding. In each case, there
was a delegation of power from a higher level authority.
Canadian constitutional powers were delegated by the
U.K. Parliament in the enactment of the British North
America Act, 1867. In the case of CIRA, its powers
resulted from a double delegation of power from the
Government of Canada and ICANN.

✄ REMOVE

Username: chauhana

Date: 11-NOV-02

Time: 17:30

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\0102_hagenarx.dat

Seq: 10

Does the double delegation of power to CIRA entail
that Canada is sovereign over the .ca? Like the authority
of Canada itself, the authority of CIRA is not completely
indigenous, derived solely from events occurring within
Canada. As was pointed out, the existence of indigenous
property law is not sufficient to enable national control
over domain mappings and the technical ability to
operate the CIRA registry was delegated by a foreign
authority, ICANN. Furthermore, under a proposed
agreement between CIRA and ICANN, CIRA must
adhere to ICANN policies concerning the interoperability of the delegated ccTLD with other parts of the
DNS and Internet. 123
A second explanation of Canada’s sovereignty over
the .ca could be that the U.S. control over the .ca has
been terminated by mutual recognition of Canada’s
policy authority over the .ca. In fact, ICANN’s delegation
of power to CIRA, together with ICANN’s acknowledgement that Canada has policy authority over the .ca,
seems to put Canada no further ahead in relation to
powers over the .ca than it was with the Statute of Westminster in the case of constitutional powers. Just as the
doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament would not
allow the U.K. Parliament to divest itself of authority
over Canada, so too the hierarchical nature of the
domain name system, with the legacy root server controlled by the U.S. DoC, does not allow authority over
domain name assignments to be divested.
Practically speaking, one might claim that Canada
can simply ignore any policies that ICANN may want
CIRA and its registrants to abide by, just as Taiwan and
the world ignore China’s attempt to legislate for Taiwan
and the U.S. ignores France’s Court orders that are
unconstitutional under U.S. law. 124 The recognition of
U.S. control, however, is embedded in software which is
run by every Internet service provider in Canada. These
domain name servers recognize the legacy root server, or
one of its clones, as authoritative for determining the
authoritative ccTLDs. In turn, individual computer users
recognize their ISP name servers as authoritative and
such recognition is encoded into the computer operating
system. Because of the importance of the rules delegating
authority to individuals ccTLDs in the root zone file and
legacy server and the physical and legal control over the
A root zone files and server by the United States government indicates that an entity is authoritative with respect
to a country code if and only if it is recognized by the
United States government as authoritative.
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Therefore, ultimate control over the .ca domain will
require a change in the technology of the DNS embodying political consent. In the case of the patriation of the
Canadian Constitution, the enactment by the United
Kingdom of s. 2 of the Canada Act 1982 together with
the shift in consent of the governed accomplished the
patriation. Patriation of the .ca will, therefore, require not
only the recognition of Canada’s policy authority by the
U.S. and ICANN, but some method of shifting the
power and authority of a foreign entity over ccTLDs to
that of the Canadian government.
The essence of the patriation of the .ca requires that
domain name mapping queries should be resolved by
national domain registries themselves rather than relying
upon a foreign root authority to solve domain name
mapping problems. If a URL is typed into a web browser
and the DNS server that it queries cannot provide an
answer, the DNS server should query a ccTLD authoritative registry server directly rather than ask the root server
which registry is authoritative over that domain. Technically, the open-source BIND software which runs most
DNS servers would likely have to be modified and/or
reconfigured to implement the needed technical
changes and new DNS protocols allowing for additional
national root servers would need to be created. 125
Thus, Canada can take it upon itself to ‘‘enlarge the
root’’ by creating an additional authoritative root server.
Canada could then require domestic ISPs to recognize
the national root as authoritative. Essentially, instead of
relying on the idea of an authoritative root which is
controlled by an independent entity, Canada would
retain authority and control over its own domain. The
issue that then arises is whether the national root will
recognize the legacy root as authoritative.
A second step in the patriation process involves
mutual peer-based recognition of authority. This step
requires that the national authority no longer recognize
the legacy root as an authority. Instead, national roots
may directly recognize other national roots as authoritative peers. This peer-to-peer approach can be extended to
other name servers as well. Currently, if a local name
server cannot provide the answer to a query, such as
gustavmahler.com, the query is sent to the root which
returns the address of the authoritative server for the
.com domain. On a peer-to-peer account, each name
server would point to all the other 243 ccTLD root
servers and the 13 Legacy root servers (or indeed, the 14
gTLD registries) as authoritative for their respective
domains. Therefore, if someone in Canada looked for
www.google.de , the resolver would query its local
nameserver as to where it should go and, failing a
response, then the local name server would direct the
query to the German .de root server which then resolves
the query. 126
At a political level then, the patriation of the .ca
would require ccTLDs to recognize each peer country’s
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ccTLD server as authoritative for such country. Just as
patriation required the rewriting of constitutional law,
the patriation of the .ca will require the rewriting of the
constitutional code of the DNS, namely, BIND or other
DNS software. Once BIND or other DNS software is
modified, reconfigured and implemented as necessary,
Internet users will seamlessly use, view, and accept the
national authority for each individual ccTLD. Their
computers and their queries would be pointed to the
relevant country ccTLD server instead of to the previous
ultimate sovereign root, indicating a shift in consent to
the authoritative country server.

Conclusion
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T

he Government of Canada has purported to delegate authority to CIRA to create and enforce .ca
policies in accordance with government principles. However, the power of ICANN, backed by the U.S. government, to control the information contained in the legacy
root server, ensures that its tacit approval is required for
CIRA operations and policy and the use of .ca domain
names. Claims to sovereignty over ccTLDs based upon
property claims are not sustainable and, at any rate, are
not sufficient to ensure national control over ccTLDs.
Canada does not, therefore, have sovereignty with
respect to the .ca domain name mappings or policies.
Much as Canada required the consent of the U.K. in

certain legislative matters prior to the patriation of the
Constitution, ICANN’s consent is required, at least tacitly, to create and enforce .ca policies.
The patriation of the Canadian Constitution was
not accomplished solely by delegating law making
power to Canada. Nor was the sovereignty of Canada
over the .ca accomplished by the delegation by ICANN
of technical authority to CIRA. Rather, the authority of
the Constitution came from a shifting of the focus of
consent from the United Kingdom to Canada in the
context of a limitation of the power to enact laws for
Canada. In analogy with the DNS, it can be said that the
courts and people ceased to look to the U.K. courts and
Parliament for the ultimate authority and instead began
to look to their own courts and Parliament for guidance
and rulings. In order to patriate the .ca therefore, .ca
registrants, registrars, ISPs, and other national Internet
players must begin to accept the ultimate authority of
the Canadian government and its designated entity,
CIRA, in relation to the .ca domain, rather than that of
the ICANN legacy servers. This will require a change in
the structure of the DNS itself.
We have recommended that ccTLDs should utilize
a non-hierarchical, peer-to-peer ccTLD domain name
system based upon the idea that each national domain
registry is the final authority over its own ccTLD, derived
from the authority of the national government associated with the ccTLD.
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